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The years since 2010 have been a period of major change for the British Armed 
Forces. In the wake of a controversial and contested Strategic Defence and 
Security Review (SDSR) in 2010, against the background of the demanding and 
difficult wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in the face of swingeing cuts to the 
defence budget, the UK defence establishment has undergone its most significant 
transformation since the end of the Cold War at least. Core capabilities have been 
withdrawn, reduced or mothballed; centrepiece procurement projects have been 
cancelled or reduced in size; and UK military commitments and ambitions scaled 
back significantly. However, perhaps the most radical and contentious changes 
have focused on redundancies and downsizing in the military force structure as a 
whole, and in the Army in particular. The 2010 SDSR, for example, announced an 
initial reduction in Army numbers by 7000, to a total regular strength of 95,000, 
accompanied by reductions of 5000 regular personnel each in the Royal Navy 
(RN) and Royal Air Force (RAF) respectively, as part of its Future Force 2020 
vision (UK Ministry of Defence 2010). The SDSR was followed in July 2012 by the 
publication of a major review into the Army force structure, Army 2020, which 
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outlined a further reduction in size to 82,500 regular personnel; its smallest size 
since the early Nineteenth Century (UK Army 2012, Summers 2011). These 
changes to personnel numbers have been reaffirmed and consolidated in the 
National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review of 
November 2015 (HM Government 2015).  
 
These reductions have been widely criticized in the media and by parts of the 
defence community, including retired senior offices. The Telegraph observed 
scathingly in 2014 that the UK now had more hairdressers than it did military 
personnel (Shute and Oliver 2014), while the UK National Defence Association 
(UKNDA) lamented the diminishment of Britain’s military strength the cuts 
represented and called for more to be spent the armed forces (Hitchens et al. 
2014).  
 
Nowhere are these controversies more apparent than in the new role that is 
assigned to reserve forces. The SDSR and Army 2020 were accompanied by a root 
and branch revision of the nature and purpose of reserves in the UK force 
structure in what has become known as the Future Reserves 2020 (FR2020) 
programme (Independent Commission 2011, Ministry of Defence 2013). FR2020 
set out to increase the size of the UK reserve, in part to make up for the cuts to 
regular forces outlined in Future Force 2020. While regular Army numbers were 
slashed, Army reserves were to be increased from 19,000 to a trained strength of 
30,000 by 2020. Moreover, the role and status of the reserves was transformed. 
The old Territorial Army (TA) was renamed as the Army Reserve, and its role 
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within and integration with the regular force structure considerably enlarged 
and enhanced.  
 
While attacked by some as a ‘fig leaf’ for cuts (Hitchens et al. 2014), and ‘a cynical 
balance sheet exercise’ (MP John Baron, cited by Farmer 2014a), we argue that 
the reforms introduced by FR2020 are significant for reasons that go beyond 
short-term cost-cutting or austerity-driven downsizing amongst the regulars. 
They are not simply a like for like replacement of regulars by reserves. More 
widely, they are a reflection of the changing nature of modern military 
organisation, and the manner in which armed forces engage with the societies of 
which they are a part, and with the citizens that make up these societies. In this 
article we examine these themes. We locate FR2020 programme in the context of 
a wider narrative about the changing nature of military organisation in 
contemporary western democracies, identifying structural, circumstantial and 
normative reasons for change. We also examine the specific challenges of 
implementing FR2020 in practice, including issues of recruitment and retention, 
integration and support, and relations with families and employers, drawing on 
the experience of comparator countries to do so. We conclude by considering the 
implications of these changes, both for the future of UK armed forces, and for the 
evolving nature of military-society relations in Britain.  
 
 
Reserve Forces and Military Organisation 
 
 4 
The changes introduced in FR2020 entail a transformation in the nature, role 
and purpose of reserves in the UK force structure. The reforms aim to create a 
trained strength of 34,900; including 30,000 in a new Army Reserve, 3,100 in the 
Royal Navy Reserve and Royal Marines Reserve, and 1,800 in the Royal Auxiliary 
Air Force. Reserves will be more closely integrated with regular forces, be 
subject to a more demanding training regime, be better supported in terms of 
pay, infrastructure and equipment, and can expect to be deployed more often, 
and across the full range of operational environments, both at home and abroad 
(UK Ministry of Defence 2013a, p. 7, HM Government 2015).1 These reforms 
represent an important shift from the traditional role of reserves in Britain, and 
reflect similar changes that have taken place across Europe, North America and 
in Australia. We identify seven inter-related drivers for the current UK reform 
process, many of which are also shared by comparator countries.  
 
The most important long-term driver for change is strategic in nature. Reserve 
forces in the UK and elsewhere were developed over the course of the 
Eighteenth, Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Historically, their role has been 
to mobilise at times of significant national emergency and homeland defence 
(Bennell 1978, pp. 42-5). Reservists could expect to be deployed only in 
extremis, on conventional battlefields, and at times generalised mass 
mobilisation. This is the pattern that has underpinned UK reserve forces for most 
of the period of their existence. However, with the end of the Cold War, strategic 
                                                        
1 SDSR 2015 proposes a consolidated figure of 35,000 for the expanded reserve 
force (HM Government 2015, p. 33).  
 5 
circumstances have shifted significantly. The wars in which western armed 
forces have been engaged since 1990 have notably not been wars of national 
survival or territorial defence or even necessarily regular warfare. They have 
instead been characterised by expeditionary security management or power 
projection operations, requiring flexible, deployable and skilled professional 
forces (Edmunds 2012, pp. 267-8). Indeed, there has been a general retreat from 
national defence missions for armed forces across Western Europe and North 
America. Military numbers have been cut dramatically, conscription abolished, 
and equipment designed for high-intensity territorial conflicts – main battle 
tanks, artillery and so on – withdrawn, reduced or mothballed (Haltiner 1998, 
pp. 7-36). At the same time, it has become more politically difficult to deploy 
‘citizen soldiers’ – whether conscripts or traditionally formed reserve forces – to 
what are often characterised as ‘wars of choice’, in contrast to conflicts of real 
national emergency or collective survival (as was at least potentially the case 
during the Cold War) (Forster 2006, pp. 1043-105, Freedman 2010, pp. 9-16, and 
Hass 2009, pp. 167-8). In this context, the traditional roles of reserve forces have 
declined in significance and, to many, seem of increasingly marginal relevance to 
contemporary security demands. 
 
Second, and in large part as a consequence of these shifts, the size and status of 
the reserve has itself changed considerably. Most notably, reserve forces across 
Europe have declined significantly in size. In the UK, the TA was the target of 
successive savings measures from 2007. These included an 80 per cent cap on 
the strength of some units, coupled with restrictions on marketing, and, in 2009 
a freeze on reservist training and pay (UK Ministry of Defence 2013, p. 16). The 
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TA was also an aging force, with personnel on average six years older than their 
regular counterparts, with new recruitment failing dramatically to keep pace 
with target numbers, and what one commentator called ‘an exodus’ of existing 
personnel (Hope 2013, Weitz 2007, p. 35). In the UK, the Territorial Army 
shrunk from a size of 76,000 in 1990 to 20,000 in 2011 (UK Ministry of Defence 
2013, pp. 14-15).2 At the same, and in common with the experiences of countries 
such as the United States, UK reserves have been asked to do more.  Between 
1997-2008, for example, 28,000 reservists were deployed on operations in Iraq, 
Afghanistan and elsewhere (UK Ministry of Defence 2012). As a consequence of 
the developments, it was clear that by 2010 UK reserves as then structured, 
were, in the words of FR2020, ‘in serious decline in terms of numbers, capability 
and morale’, and increasingly overstretched in their role (UK Ministry of Defence 
2013, p. 17). For these reasons alone, a major root and branch reform of the 
Territorial Army was both inevitable and pressing.  
 
A third and related driver for change can be found in the wider evolution of 
British – and to some degree western – military organisation as a whole. The 
changes in strategic circumstance and military role discussed above, have also 
had important implications for the composition and structure of military 
organisation. In general terms, the complexity of overseas expeditionary 
missions, in what are often contested, ambiguous and difficult operational 
environments, has engendered a need for more highly skilled, technologically 
                                                        
2 Even this figure seems ambitious, with FR2020 noting the TA’s active trained 
strength could be as low as 14,000 (UK Ministry of Defence 2013a, pp. 14-15).  
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advanced and professionalised military forces (UK Ministry of Defence 2013, p. 
343). Such forces are more expensive and require longer and more intensive 
training than their territorial defence counterparts of the Cold War period. They 
also tend to be smaller in size, with military advantage coming from the 
information-driven application of expert military knowledge and capacities 
rather than mass of numbers. Anthony King (2013) has characterised this 
process as one of ‘concentration’, in which combat forces have become 
increasingly focused on a highly professionalised military elite, united by intense 
patterns of training, drill and competence.  
 
These changes have at least three implications for reserve forces. First, they 
require that, if reservists are to be integrated and interoperable with regular 
forces on deployment, then they too must be trained and drilled to a sufficiently 
high standard. Second, they imply that it may be more efficient to concentrate 
regular forces on ‘core’ military activities, while specialist skills and support 
capacities are provided from elsewhere; whether that be through the reserve, 
from allies, or through private contractors (Heinecken 2013, pp. 625-646). 
Finally, they suggest that reserve forces can expect to be deployed more 
regularly in order to augment and support the ‘concentrated’ regular force 
structure. Indeed, one of the implications of concentration in the regulars is that 
the army may struggle to deploy in force without these additional capacities. 
This shift is of a potentially fundamental nature for UK reserves. As part of the 
old TA, reservists could enjoy the various benefits of reserve service, including 
military and adventure training and the development of new skills, as well as the 
camaraderie associated with being part of a regiment or the like, but with a very 
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low risk of wartime deployment short of a national emergency. The FR2020 
reforms challenge this model, while the expectation that reservists will deploy in 
formed sub-units, may even suggest that the voluntary nature of reservist 
deployment could be eroded. At a minimum, and as we discuss further below, 
this suggests that pressures on reservists in balancing their military role with 
families and civilian employment are likely to increase significantly.  Taken 
together, these changes represent a major shift in the role of the reserve; from 
supplementary forces to be called on at times of national emergency, to an 
integrated and indispensible part of the force structure as a whole. In UK 
parlance, this has become known as the ‘Whole Force Approach’, and underpins 
the reforms introduced by the FF 2020 programme (Louth and Quention 2014).  
 
Fourth, the logic of the Whole Force Approach is that it is more effective and 
efficient to draw on specialist capacities from dedicated providers and the 
civilian labour force, rather than to develop such skills indigenously within the 
regular force structure. This assumption has important implications for the 
development of specialist skills in the reserves. It is argued that the reserves 
provide a key opportunity for the armed forces to exploit existing expertise in 
the civilian sector, in areas such as medicine, linguistics or cyber security. 
Indeed, in the UK case, medical reserves have been routinely deployed on 
operations, making up 40 per cent of hospital staff in Afghanistan for example 
(UK Ministry of Defence 2013, p. 19). The US experience is even more 
pronounced with 97 per cent of civil affairs units, 72 per cent of psychological 
operations units, and 70 per cent of medical units being concentrated in the 
reserves in 2007 (Weitz 2001, p. 12). It no surprise therefore that FR2020 places 
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the development and provision of the specialist skills in the reserves, at the heart 
of its justification for reform (UK Ministry of Defence 2013, p. 9). 
 
Fifth, there are ideological, political and financially driven justifications for 
reform. One of the first statements in the FR2020 document references a desire 
to better harness ‘the talents and volunteer ethos of the country’, in direct 
reference to the Cameron government’s so-called ‘Big Society’ initiative of 2010 
(UK Ministry of Defence 2013, pp. 4, 10). At the same time, they are taking place 
at a time of significant budgetary constraint in the defence sector as a whole, as 
part of the Cameron government’s wider public austerity drive. These cuts have 
been criticised from within the defence establishment and more widely, as either 
short-sighted penny pinching by defence-blind politicians (Graydon et al. 2015), 
or as economically short-sighted (Joseph Stiglitz cited in Anthony 2015). Either 
way, it is difficult to see how defence can avoid its share of cuts, with the public 
showing no great appetite to devote more money to defence spending, whether 
in absolute terms or relative to other departments (Edmunds 2010, pp. 391-3). 
At the same time, contractual or other structural obstacles in the defence 
establishment mean that further savings on, for example, major procurement 
projects or infrastructure are likely to be difficult (Chalmers 2015, pp. 10-15). In 
this context, the personnel budget is one area in which the MoD does seem able 
to make further financial savings, albeit not without some considerable 
organisational cost. Thus, for the moment at least, the reduction in regular Army 
numbers appears to be an inevitable consequence of the UK’s current political 
and financial circumstances. In this context, the expansion and reform of the 
reserves appears to represent a mechanism through which key military 
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capacities can be preserved in line with the strategic and organisational 
imperatives discussed above, at somewhat lower cost than through the regular 
force structure (UK Ministry of Defence 2015a).  Indeed, Farrell et. al. (2013, 
p.188) note that the scale and speed of the military personnel cuts announced by 
the government in 2007 came as a ‘complete surprise to the Army leadership’, 
and forced them to consider novel solutions to the sudden reduction in 
manpower. The focus on reserves was further encouraged by a government 
decision to allocate £1 billion of the agreed defence budget for investment in 
reserve forces. The MoD itself has projected that the new force structure 
introduced by FR2020 would achieve staffing savings for the Army alone of £5.3 
billion in the ten years from 2012-13 to 2021-22 (National Audit Office 2014). 
 
That said, the financial savings presented by employing reserve forces over their 
regular counterparts are not always straightforward, particularly during a 
period of major reform and transformation such as that represented by FR2020. 
At a minimum, the immediate costs of transition are significant. These include 
the expense of redundancy payments to those regulars who are laid off, as well 
as the investment required to institute such a major organisational change. 
Indeed, RF2020 has been accompanied by an additional investment of £1.8 
billion over 10 years in order to support the required reforms (UK Ministry of 
Defence 2012, p. 6). The introduction of a new recruitment system for FR2020 
with the private contractor Capita, was originally expected to deliver savings of 
some £267 million. However, problems with the implementation of the contract 
and new IT system have considerably disrupted this process, costing the MoD an 
estimated £70 million in the period to 2014 (HoCPA 2014, pp. 10-11). Even once 
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the FR2020 reforms have been established and consolidated, the UK’s new 
reserve structures are likely to be more expensive than the earlier reserve forces 
they replace. Not only will the new reserve need to be better supported 
financially and in terms of equipment and training, they are also likely to be 
mobilised more frequently. In this context, the FR2020 document itself concedes 
that, while current reserve forces cost around 20 per cent of a comparable 
regular unit when not mobilised, that same unit is only 10-15 per cent cheaper 
than its regular counterpart on deployment. Indeed, it is striking that when 
looking at comparator countries the role and significance of reserves is not seen 
primarily in terms of their relative cost-effectiveness, but more in terms of the 
strategic and organisational rationales already discussed above (Weitz 2007, 
Ministry of Defence 2013, p. 61).  
 
Sixth, reserves can provide an additional, arguably more cost-effective, 
manpower and capabilities pool for national resilience and homeland security 
tasks, as and when they arise (UK Ministry of Defence 2013, pp. 26-27). They can 
also be employed as a repository for trained personnel, skills and capacities that 
can form the basis of a regeneration of currently de-prioritised capabilities, such 
as artillery for example, should the circumstances of national security require it 
(UK Ministry of Defence 2013, p. 27).3 To this end, FR2020 proposes a ‘properly 
constituted’ military capability, based in the reserves, to support the civil 
authority at times of domestic emergency and disaster (UK Ministry of Defence 
2013, p. 27). Certainly, UK armed forces, including reserves, have been deployed 
                                                        
3 See also, Malinson 2014, pp. 111-3.  
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in these capacities on numerous occasions in recent years, including during the 
foot and mouth crisis of 2001, and during flooding Cumbria in 2009 and 2015, 
and in Somerset in 2014. This also mirrors practice in other countries, including 
the United States, France, Germany and Canada, where reserve forces have a key, 
often formalised, role in national resilience and homeland security (Weitz 2007). 
The location of such capacities in the reserve is in line with the logic of 
concentration in the armed forces discussed above, with regular armed forces 
focusing on core, combat-orientated roles, and other tasks being conducted from 
elsewhere within the Whole Force structure.  
 
Seventh, and finally, reserve forces can have an important function in connecting 
the armed forces to the societies of which they are a part, and vice-versa. 
Certainly, FR2020 claims on its first page that a transformation of UK reserves 
could enable the armed forces to ‘become better integrated with, and understood 
by, the society from which they draw their people’ (UK Ministry of Defence 2013, 
p. 4). Historically, this has been an important component of the TA and reservist 
role more widely, in the UK and elsewhere. As Dandeker et. al. (2011, p. 349) 
observe, reserve centres and facilities [alongside Cadet Forces and University 
Service Units] are often the only tangible presence that the military may have in 
particular geographical areas of the country. In this sense, they present a ‘face’ of 
the armed forces to communities in which it would otherwise be absent, while 
their explicitly ‘territorial’ nature represents a tangible and sometimes intimate 
link between location and military service in the unit concerned. Because the 
reserves recruit from across society – from a range of different trades, 
professions, social classes and geographic areas – it has also functioned 
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historically as a conduit for military familiarisation and representation in a 
civilian world that may have little connection to or experience of the armed 
forces in their regular, professional guise (see Beckett 2008). Such patterns are 
visible elsewhere too. France, for example, maintains a Citizens’ Reserve 
alongside its Operational Reserve for precisely this purpose (Weber 2011, pp. 
327-9), while in the United States, such civil-military considerations have long 
underpinned the role of the National Guard. In Germany, the Ministry of Defence, 
is explicit that its reserve forces  ‘are the mediators between the Bundeswehr and 
the civilian sector of society’, and ‘contribute to sustaining motivation for 
military service and help people to see security issues in a wider context’ (Weitz 
2007, p. 49). 
 
Reservists in all armed forces move regularly between civil and military worlds, 
and, in many ways, are located in both. As a consequence, they can function as 
‘mediums for a constant flow of ideas’ and experience between the two (Lomsky-
Feder et al. 2007, p. 598). These exchanges occur during the actual period of 
reserve service deployment alongside regulars, and to a lesser extent during 
training. However, the experiences, relationships and knowledge they engender 
can also extend long beyond a reservist’s actual period of service, and so 
represent a potentially enduring link between armed forces and society. Thus, 
FR2020’s goal to revitalise UK reserve forces in military and public life may also, 
by implication, assist in revitalising UK military-society relations. This is an 
important task  
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given the smaller size and greater exclusivity of the more concentrated regular 
force structure, but also given the difficult popular legacies of the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan (Gribble et al. 2014, pp. 128-50). 
 
There are therefore important structural, organisational and normative reasons 
for the current transformation of UK reserve forces. However, the FR2020 
programme also faces a series of major challenges. In the following section we 
explore these issues. We argue that many of the strategic and organisational 
rationales for the reforms remain sound and are not driven simply by cost 
cutting. However, we also suggest the UK defence establishment has consistently 
underestimated the role of military-society relations in conditioning their 
implementation. Perhaps nowhere are these tensions more apparent than in the 
difficult issues of recruitment and retention.  
 
 
Recruitment and Retention  
 
Issues of recruitment and particularly retention represent perhaps the biggest 
obstacle to the successful implementation of the FR2020 programme. We have 
already noted that the Territorial Army was suffering from major manpower 
problems by 2010, with a trained strength that fell some 17,000 short of its 
‘establishment’ or target figure (UK Ministry of Defence 2013, p. 16). This is not 
just a UK problem, and similar challenges are faced by the reserve force 
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structures of almost all comparator countries.4 FR2020 too has struggled in this 
regard, at least in its first few years of implementation. The programme sets 
ambitious recruitment targets on the Army Reserve in particular, while also 
introducing new demands on recruits, which makes their transition to trained 
status more difficult and time-consuming than before. Thus, for example, 
achieving the new establishment target of 30,000 reservists by the end of 
financial year 2018-19 will require an increase of 11,000 trained reservist 
personnel from 2013-14 numbers. In practice, the reserves must recruit 
considerably more new entrants than this ultimate figure implies. This is 
because the natural turnover from existing reserves is itself considerable, while 
the ‘conversion’ rate of those personnel recruited to those trained is only around 
34 per cent (National Audit Office 2014, p. 34). In fact, the MoD’s annual target 
figures for new recruits into the Army Reserve start at 3,600 in 2014-15, rising 
to 6,000 in 2015-16, to 8,000 by 2016-17 (National Audit Office 2014, p. 34). 
 
Initially, recruitment fell short of these figures though by 2016 was showing 
signs of significant improvement. Thus, for example, for the year 2013-14, the 
total number of personnel recruited into the Army Reserve was 2,960, against an 
outflow of 4,620, representing an overall decrease in strength of 1660 personnel. 
The figures for 2014-15 were better, at 5,210 new entrants against a target of 
4900, but again set against an outflow of 3,350, leading to an effective increase of 
1,860 (HL925 2015). Recruitment and retention figures for 2015 were stronger. 
Between 1 January and 30 December, 6480 personnel were recruited into the 
                                                        
4 And indeed many non-western ones too. See, for example, Weitz (2001, p. vii).  
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Army Reserve against an outflow of 2850, and increase of 3630 personnel (UK 
Ministry of Defence 2015, p. 8). Even then, and taken on their own, these figures 
say little about the number of these new recruits who go on to full trained status. 
Manpower figures released by the MoD in November 2014, suggested that, 
taking into account new recruitment and natural turnover, the trained strength 
of the Army reserve had increased by just 20 from the following year; from 
19,290 to 19,310 (Farmer 2014b). Again, by 2016, the figures had improved 
significantly, showing a 10.1% increase in the size of the trained reserve, from 
20,480 to 22,550 – an additional 2080 trained personnel – between January 
2015 and January 2016 (Farmer 2014b).  
 
As the MoD itself notes, these figures need to be treated with care given known 
difficulties in data collection and quality (2015b), including an opacity over the 
status of reservists who have not turned up for training for extended periods, or 
a suggestion of creative accounting in relation to who counts as trained and who 
not. Even so, the broad picture is one of significant initial difficulties in 
recruitment, followed by improvements from 2015, though with continuing 
problems of retention, and challenges in moving to the ultimate target of a 
30,000 trained strength by 2018-19. Certainly, the recruitment issue at least has 
attracted criticism from the press and other commentators. The House of 
Commons Public Accounts Committee suggested that its targets were derived 
from ‘bold assumptions rather than robust evidence’ (HoCPA 2014, p. 12), while 
General the Lord Dannatt, a former head of the Army, suggested that the policy 
was ‘based on hope rather than any science’ (Farmer 2014a). Still others were of 
the view that it was premature and risky for the Army to frontload redundancies 
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in the regular force structure on the basis of overly optimistic assumptions about 
recruitment into the new reserve (National Audit Office 2014, p. 89).  
 
Stung by this criticism the MoD and Army have since embarked on a major new 
advertising and publicity campaign for reserve forces and reviewed their 
recruitment processes since 2014 (Woodward et al. 2015). They have also 
offered new financial inducements for applicants and new recruits. These 
include a cash payment of £300 to applicants to cover travel expenses associated 
with the initial recruitment process, and two subsequent payments of £1000 
each on completion of key phases of training (National Audit Office 2014, p. 35). 
Ex-regulars have also been offered a bounty of up to £10,000 to sign up with the 
reserves within six years of discharge (British Army Website 2016). It remains to 
be seen how successful these initiatives will prove, though recent figures may 
give cause for optimism, as noted above. The additional incentives offered to ex-
regulars appear to have been particularly effective in the wider context of 
downsizing in the regular force structure. Over the long term however, their 
attractiveness seems likely to depend on the underlying reasons for the current 
shortfall. Here, we argue that there are three classes of challenge facing 
recruiters. The first are largely circumstantial and can be remedied through 
relatively straightforward measures. The second and third group of challenges 
are structurally derived and relate to underlying issues of military-society 
relations. These are considerably more difficult to address, and, we believe, have 
been consistently underestimated in military personnel policy to date.  
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The Army itself has identified a number for the difficulties it has experienced in 
recruiting to the reserves. These are primarily circumstantial in nature. They 
include a major breakdown in its recruitment process, and particularly the 
difficulties experienced in implementing a new relationship with the recruitment 
contractor, Capita, as discussed above. The impact of these problems was 
significant, leading to major delays and frustrations for applicants, and causing 
many to abandon the process entirely (HoPCA 2014, p. 5). They also cite the 
winding down of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which, in the Army’s view 
removed a major motivation for some people to enlist. Certainly, there is some 
evidence from the UK and elsewhere, that the prospect and likelihood of regular 
deployment can be a key factor in motivating military recruitment, including into 
the reserves (Earnshaw and Price 2011, p. 29). However, this factor needs to be 
balanced against some of the other organisational and professional challenges 
faced by reservists on deployment, and which we discuss in the following 
section. In addition, the Army argued that the concurrent process of major 
redundancies in the regular forces sent a conflicting message on military 
recruitment to the general public. At the same time, it faced a series of 
constraints in its marketing activities in 2011-12, driven by the need to save 
costs and in the run-up to Capita assuming responsibility for marketing in 
October 2012 (National Audit Office 2014, p. 35).  
 
Each of these reasons is valid in its own terms, and indeed lend themselves to 
amelioration by the remedial measures introduced by the Army and MoD. 
However, we also argue that there are two deeper, more intractable, challenges 
that underpin some of the recruitment difficulties faced by FR2020. The first of 
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these relates to the changing nature of threat, the concomitant decline of the 
mass army in Europe, the manner in which the British general public relate to 
their armed forces more generally, and to the prospect of reservist service 
specifically. During the Cold War, reserve forces were legitimised and sustained 
by the prospect of a war for national survival should the superpower 
confrontation ignite. Reservist service was thus driven by an enhanced sense of 
national threat, and a clear, collectively-orientated motivation for mobilisation 
should it occur. In contrast, and at least until the recent round of Russian military 
assertiveness in Ukraine and elsewhere, military and territorial threat 
perceptions in Europe today are lower than they have been for many decades. 
This decline in threat perceptions emerges both in public opinion polling over 
the period, and consistently in official defence and security and security 
documentation across European states and security organisations (Edmunds 
2010, pp. 391-3; 2012, pp. 278-80).  
 
In the absence of a dominant perception of hegemonic threat, publics across 
Europe have disengaged from militarised notions of collective national defence 
and military service. This pattern can be seen in the decline of conscription and 
mass armies across Europe, in a major and generalised decline in the amount 
European countries spend on defence, and recruitment and in retention 
difficulties in the armed forces themselves (Williams 2006, pp. 1-34). In the UK 
case, the Army particularly has been consistently understrength against its 
manpower requirement for much of post-Cold War period (National Audit Office 
2014, pp. 11-12), and, in 2013-14, missed its regular soldier recruitment target 
by 30 per cent (HoCPA 2014, p. 10). These issues have been especially 
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pronounced in the reserves, the traditional role of which has historically been 
linked closely to the national defence mission. Indeed, it is well recognised, 
including in the FR2020 document itself, that increased threat perceptions 
increases tolerance for service in the reserves (UK Ministry of Defence 2013, p. 
62). However, the impact of this tendency is perhaps more significant than has 
been widely recognised. It suggests current recruitment difficulties in the UK 
reserve may be influenced as much by longer-term geostrategic trends across 
Europe, and their concomitant impact on military-society relations in the UK and 
elsewhere, as by the specific circumstances of the FR2020 programme itself.  
 
A second and related challenge concerns deeper themes of social change in 
contemporary western societies; and in particular the manner in which 
individuals engage with the state and its institutions. Broadly, these changes 
entail a shift away from collectivist identities, whether in relation to the state, 
workplace or public life, to more individualistic and pluralistic societies (Tresch 
2011, p. 245, Inglehart 1977). Military sociologists have devoted considerable 
attention to these themes in recent years. For Moskos (1997), they are captured 
by a tension between ‘institutional’ and ‘occupational’ motivations for service in 
the armed forces. Institutional motivations incorporate intangible values and 
norms, such as duty to country, loyalty, commitment, sacrifice and so on. 
Occupational motivations concern tangible and immediate benefits, including 
comparative pay, technical training, working conditions, enlistment incentives 
and so on (Eighmey 2006, p. 308). In the UK, successive British Social Attitudes 
(BSA) surveys suggest that these changes find expression in a wider 
liberalisation of social attitudes, as well as an increasing preference for 
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individual over collectivist identities, particularly amongst the young (see British 
Social Attitudes, 2013, The Economist 2013). Indeed, these trends are most 
pronounced amongst those born after 1979, and who, after all, form the primary 
recruitment base for the armed forces, including reservists. Britons from this 
younger generation are less likely to have a ‘high or very high’ opinion of the 
armed forces than their older counterparts. They are more sceptical of 
collectivist endeavour more generally, being ‘less likely to belong to a political 
party or trade union, or to proclaim a belief in one of the established religions, 
than almost any previous generation in history’ (Kingman 2013), and also more 
likely to be suspicious of the institutional conformism required by totalising 
institutions such as the armed forces. 
 
Generally speaking, scholars agree that the decline of conscription and the mass 
army, coupled with these wider societal changes have led to occupational factors 
becoming more significant in recruitment and retention. In essence, decisions to 
join or remain within the armed forces have become more conditional and 
contingent than perhaps was the case in the past. Again, these patterns are 
particularly pronounced for reservists, because so much of their identity 
formation takes place beyond the confines of the military institution itself. Taken 
in isolation, these shifts do not necessarily imply problems for recruitment, 
particularly if the occupational ‘offer’ is seen to be favourable and generous. 
However, they do suggest that the expectations of those considering joining or 
remaining within the reserves may be more exacting than previously assumed, 
and more fragile in the face of problems either in service or in the wider civilian 
environment, including at home or in work. This is particularly relevant given 
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the increased demands that are likely to be placed on reserve forces under the 
FR2020 model, the emphasis placed on ‘volunteer ethos’ in its initial conception, 
and, indeed, the already noted problems of retention in the reserve force. It is to 
these challenges that this article now turns.  
 
 
 
Transmigrants and Greedy Institutions 
 
Issues around the relative manpower balance between regular and reserve 
forces, as well as recruitment into the latter, have dominated the public debate 
on FR2020 to date. However, perhaps the most radical element of FR2020 is the 
manner in which the new reserves are to be used, and, in particular, their 
transformation from a strategic to an operational force. As discussed above, 
traditional conceptions of the reservist role have focused on their strategic 
mobilisation at times of national emergency. However, during the post-Cold War 
period, reserves in both the US and UK have increasingly been used in a more 
routine, operational capacity as well. FR2020 formalises this shift to an 
operational reserve for the UK as part of the wider Whole Force Approach. In 
particular, it proposes a new ‘bargain’ for UK reserve forces. On the one hand, 
reservists are presented with a stronger ‘proposition’; more opportunities for 
training, career progression, command and leadership roles, and so on, as well as 
improved rates of pay and better employment protection and employer support. 
On the other, the reserves will need to able to be more closely integrated with 
the regular force structure, including greater expectations of their quality and 
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availability for more routine mobilisation on operations (UK Ministry of Defence 
2013, p. 5).  
 
FR2020 is thus underpinned by two core components, united by a common 
assumption. The first is that the armed forces will ask more of their reserve 
personnel. Reservists can expect to be deployed more frequently and with 
considerably less flexibility for individual circumstances than has been the case 
in the past. They will be expected to train more routinely and regularly, and to be 
able to integrate closely with their regular counterparts when mobilised (UK 
Ministry of Defence 2013, pp. 7, 9). In return, and second, they will better 
remunerated and supported within the force structure as a whole. The 
assumption that underpins these changes is essentially occupational in nature, in 
that the balance between the demands of the new role and reservists’ 
willingness to fulfil it are primarily transactional in nature: the greater the 
tangible incentives on offer, the more that can be asked of the reservists 
themselves.  
 
The logic of this bargain is sound, at least in relation to regular forces, and 
chimes well with the thrust of the institutional/occupational debate in military 
sociology discussed earlier. That said, we think that there are some significant 
problems entailed in extending such narrowly transactional premises to reserve 
forces. In particular, they risk failing to understand the increasing demands of 
both civilian and military environments in reservist life. Unlike regular service 
personnel, reservists exist in both military and civilian environments, as well as 
across them. Lomsky-Feder et al. have conceptualised this peculiar civil-military 
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status as one of ‘transmigration’. They argue that reserves are best understood 
as ‘travellers between civilian and military worlds’ (2007, p. 594). In this context, 
their civilian lives continually filter into and influence their military role, and 
vice-versa, creating a unique series of motivations, pressures, and identities. As 
Griffith notes, reservists are both ‘special soldiers’ and ‘special civilians’ at the 
same time (2009, p. 4). 
 
This special status of reservists has at least three implications for civil-military 
relations, and our understanding of their role within them. First, it implies that 
reserves fit into a special sociological category of their own; and that established 
assumptions about regular personnel – whether in relation to recruitment and 
retention, ethos, role or deployment – cannot simply be carried over without 
modification. For example, a number of scholars note that voluntaristic and 
institutional motivations for service, may be particularly important for reservist 
soldiers (2007, p. 310). Second, that the dominant cultural ethos of the regulars – 
in the US and UK often focused around their role as professionalised war-fighting 
soldiers – may be in tension with some of the wider social and symbolic roles of 
reserve forces (Walker 1992, p. 308). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it 
implies that reserve service needs to be understood as taking place in a dynamic, 
sometimes antagonistic, matrix of relationships between the dominant 
institutions of both military and civilian life. One way of conceptualising these 
demands is through the lens of what have been called ‘greedy institutions’. The 
greedy institution is a sociological concept, used to describe those institutions 
that make great demands on individuals in terms of commitment, loyalty, time 
and energy (Coser 1974). Military sociologists commonly identify two key 
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greedy institutions in the civil-military relationship: the military itself, and the 
family (Segal 1986, pp. 9-38). In the case of reservists, who travel between 
military and civilian worlds, we also argue that a third institution needs to be 
included in this matrix: that of civilian employment. Below, we examine the 
demands that each of these institutions make on reservists lives, and consider 
how these might be changing in the contemporary period.  
 
In the reservist context, perhaps the most important impact of the FR2020 
reforms is that it makes the military, an already greedy institution, even greedier. 
The demands of an operational reserve – in terms of time commitment, 
deployments away from home, and, indeed, potential for risk to life and limb – 
are considerably greater than those of the traditional strategic reserve role. At 
the same time, reservists do not generally have access to the same range of 
benefits and support networks to help them cope with these demands, as those 
of their more fully institutionalised regular counterparts. These differences are 
particularly pronounced at times of mobilisation, and including issues of pre-
deployment training and preparation, integration while on operations, and post-
deployment support.  
 
While UK reservists are increasingly expected to integrate closely with their 
regular counterparts when mobilised, various studies from the UK and 
comparator countries suggest that they face particularly challenges in doing so. 
At a minimum, an expectation of closer and more routine integration with 
regulars is likely to increase the training burden of reserve forces, particularly 
given the increased demands of professional concentration discussed above. This 
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is problematic both because of the more limited time available for the training of 
reserve personnel (with a minimum commitment of only 20 days a year), but 
also because the timetabling of reserve training sessions – on evenings and 
weekends – can lead to an isolation from their regular counterparts, who 
primarily train during normal working hours. Thus, the level of training required 
by particular roles within the armed forces also mean that reservists serving in a 
similar roles – particularly those in specialist units such as commandos for 
example – can find it very difficult to achieve the levels of fitness and knowledge 
required to progress upwards through the ranks. Elsewhere, Brown et. al found 
that most UK reservists in Iraq tended to be mobilised as individuals rather than 
with their parent units. Such individualised deployments can lead to isolation 
and a greater risk of mental health problems on operations, as well as poorer 
relations with the chain of command (Browne et al. 2007, p. 487). Moreover, the 
stark transition from civilian life to military operations appears to have left many 
with ‘minimal time to process adverse fears and put their affairs in order’, 
leading to greater psychological stress both on and after deployment (Brown et 
al. 2007, p. 488). 
 
The individualised nature of many reservists’ mobilisation experience also 
means that they can come into formed units without the established social 
networks and relationships of their colleagues. Dandeker et. al. (2010, p. 274) 
argue that, on reaching their units, many reservists were not easily accepted by 
their regular counterparts. Their complaints include a perceived lack of respect, 
and a tendency to be allocated the most unrewarding tasks and roles, and to be 
issued with inadequate kit and equipment (Dandeker et. al. 2010, p. 275. 
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Dandeker et. al. 2011, p. 275). These findings mirror those of similar studies in 
both the US (Moskos 2005, pp. 663-76) and Sweden (Danielsson and Carlstedt 
2011, p. 293). This tendency towards individualised deployment also has 
implications for the difficulties many reserves face post-deployment. When 
regulars return home, they do so with their units and to the institutional and 
social support networks of an established military community. In contrast, 
reservists return home alone, and to an often-rapid transition back to their 
civilian employment. Hotopf et al. (2006, p. 1739)  argue that the nature of these 
shifts can often be traumatic, with deployment impacting negatively on the 
mental health of reservists to a far greater extent than their regular 
counterparts, and making it more difficult for them to reintegrate back into 
civilian life when they return. Reservists returning as individuals also tend to 
miss out on the formal ceremonies that regulars participate in on return as unit, 
these include civic displays of gratitude such as marching through their base’s 
home towns and associate visible and tangible displays of gratitude for their 
service. 
 
 It is clear therefore, that the demands made by the military institution on the 
reservist are considerable, and will likely intensify as the shift to an operational 
reserve consolidates. However, these pressures are intensified by the other 
greedy institutions that make demands on reservists’ time and commitment. The 
first of these is the family. The tensions between military service and family life 
have long been acknowledged, and are prevalent amongst regular personnel too 
(Segal 1986). Moskos et. al. (1999) argue that they have intensified in recent 
decades, in line with the wider processes of social change in western societies 
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outlined above. These include the tendency for more military spouses to have 
jobs and careers of their own, and a greater expectation that fathers participate 
in the life and work of the home. This can make military commitments, and 
especially deployment, more difficult to manage. However, reservists again face 
additional obstacles in this regard. Unlike their regular counterparts, reservist 
families are less likely to live in dedicated military communities, and so have less 
ready access to the social and institutional support networks that these tend to 
provide. They are likely to be more socially isolated than their regular 
equivalents, and may struggle to accept or tolerate the considerable demands of 
deployment (Dandeker et al. 2010, p. 279, Dandeker et al. 2011, p. 350).  
 
Reservists also face demands from a third greedy institution, unique to their 
status as part time soldiers; that of civilian employment. As Griffith (2009, p. 5) 
notes, the dominant social context for most reserve soldiers is the civilian 
environment rather than the military institution. Indeed, the bulk of any 
reservists’ time, energy and commitment are likely to directed towards their 
civilian, rather than military careers. Under the old strategic reserve model, 
demands on reservist civilian jobs, careers and employers were limited; with the 
requirements of the role commonly confined to attending regular evening and 
weekend training commitments, as well as attending an annual camp. The 
prospect of deployment was remote, and only likely in the event of a national 
emergency. Under such circumstances, the tensions between a reservist’s 
military service and civilian career were relatively straightforward, if not always 
easy, to manage. In contrast, however, the greater and more frequent demands 
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made by participation in an active operational reserve are likely to be harder to 
cope with.   
 
For example, the government’s own consultation on FR2020, found that ‘around 
half of reservists said that they had been disadvantaged in some way in the 
civilian workplace [as a consequence of their reserve service]’ (UK Ministry of 
Defence 2013, p. 4). Perceptions of disadvantage ranged from concerns that the 
time out required by deployment meant that reservists could miss out on career 
opportunities and promotion due to their absence, to a small proportion that 
believed that they had lost their jobs as a consequence. For their part, many 
employers, particularly those from small businesses, registered disquiet at the 
prospect of even greater demands being made on their employees’ time. They 
also expressed dissatisfaction with what was seen to be the overly bureaucratic 
and cumbersome process through which they could claim financial assistance, 
and suggested that the benefits offered by the current system of compensation 
did not outweigh the costs (UK Ministry of Defence 2013a, p. 44, 2013b, pp. 5, 
22). 
 
Thus, and uniquely amongst armed forces personnel, reservists find themselves 
caught within a ‘iron triangle’ of greedy institutions. The MoD recognises some of 
these pressures. FR2020 has been followed by a consultation document that 
included a series of proposals aimed at ameliorating them. These include the 
strengthening of SaBRE, a dedicated MoD programme for employer liaison (See 
SaBRE 2016); an aspiration to work more actively to bring the families of 
mobilised reservists into established military support networks; consideration of 
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new financial rewards for employers of reservists, together with new partnering 
arrangements on professional training and education; and the introduction of 
new legislation requiring that reservist mobilisation be given the same status as 
maternity or paternity leave (UK Ministry of Defence 2012, pp. 38, 29, 25). Even 
so, employers have met many of these measures with scepticism (UK Ministry of 
Defence 2013b, pp. 14, 22, 27). Similarly, the consultation document is explicit 
that, in relation to family support, the MoD does ‘not envisage significant changes 
to current arrangements’ (UK Ministry of Defence 2012, p. 38). Given the 
tensions between the iron triangle of greedy institutions we discuss above, and 
the expectation that the military now needs to become even greedier, it is 
difficult not to be sceptical of their efficacy. Indeed, we argue that they indicate a 
fundamental misunderstanding on the part of the MoD of the role, importance 
and voice of the ‘civil’ in the civil-military relationship. Further, they suggest that 
some of the core assumptions underpinning FR2020 may be flawed, and will 
require significant reappraisal if the transformation of Britain’s reserve forces is 
to proceed as planned.  
 
 
Soldiers, Citizens and Societies 
 
The transformation of UK reserve forces presented in FR2020 represents a bold 
and strategically justifiable attempt to balance the competing demands of a 
changing security environment, military modernisation, domestic politics, and 
austerity in the defence budget. It is, inevitably, a compromise of sorts, especially 
when considered in the light of the major cuts in regular army manpower it 
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accompanies. However, it is a compromise that also mirrors practice in a number 
of comparator countries, the reserves of which are significantly better manned in 
proportion to their British equivalent (UK Ministry of Defence 2012, p. 51). In 
this context, it does not seem unreasonable for the MoD to state in 2013, that it 
was ‘confident that the [recruitment] targets can be met. The total requirement 
represents only 0.15 per cent of the overall UK workforce and, in an historic, 
context, we require only about half the strength of the Reserves as they were in 
1990’ (UK Ministry of Defence 2013a, p. 14).  
 
However, a more considered analysis suggests that this assumption is over-
optimistic, and perhaps even naïve. In particular, it fails to recognise the 
significantly changed societal context in which the reforms must take place, and 
the likely impact and implications of increasing the demands of reservist service 
in the context. Against this background, it is perhaps unsurprising that the new 
Army Reserve has struggled to recruit to target, and to retain reservists once 
they have joined. If it is to do so, then it must recognise and address the unique 
status of reservist soldiers in the civil-military nexus, and the particular 
pressures that are placed on them by the ‘iron triangle’ of greedy institutions in 
which they are located. More generous incentives for reserve service are 
important, however, it is crucial that these are not understood in simple financial 
or transactional terms. Indeed, if the pressures of the iron triangle are to be 
properly addressed and ameliorated, then it will require a more considered and 
sustained programme of engagement with and support for the families and 
employers of reservists. In essence, and following our earlier analysis, we believe 
that the ‘civil’ component of the civil-military relationship for reservists needs to 
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be taken more seriously, and incorporated more fully and comprehensively into 
the FR2020 package as a whole. We recognise that such measures may blunt 
some of the cost savings of the reforms. However, we believe they are necessary 
if change is to be successfully implemented. We also believe that, if the armed 
forces are asking more of their reservist personnel, they have a duty to ensure 
that those personnel are properly supported and compensated for their service. 
This is an assumption that underpins the UK’s Armed Forces Covenant. We 
believe it should underpin the FR2020 programme too.  
 
The UK’s experience in implementing the FR2020 is indicative of wider themes 
of civil-military relations, in Britain and across Europe and other comparator 
countries too. In particular, it suggests that domestic political and social 
influences have become increasingly assertive features of military organisation. 
It is striking that the FR2020 programme has been driven in large part by a 
domestic political unwillingness to spend more on defence, and the 
organisational change and adaptation that has become necessary as a 
consequence. At the same time, the implementation of these reforms, while 
taking place against a sound strategic and military organisational logic, has been 
conditioned in practice by a series of obstacles deriving from the wider social 
context. This in turn suggests that, if defence policy is to remain sustainable and 
legitimate, it needs to take society more seriously. It cannot simply be enough to 
view defence in narrow strategic, institutional or doctrinal terms. It is, instead, 
closely integrated with – and ultimately dependent on – the social context of 
which it is a part.  
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